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SUMMARY 
Deciding on the development path of the economy has been a delicate question in economic policy, not least because of the trade-off 
effects which immediately worsen certain economic indicators as steps are taken to improve on others. The paper offers help to 
decide on such policy dilemmas, based on an analysis conducted among OECD countries with the FOI model (focusing on the future, 
outside and inside potentials). Several development models can be deduced with this method, from which only the dual model is 
discussed in detail. The dual model implies a development strategy focused on the attraction of outside resources, the instruments of 
which are also presented. The findings presented in the paper are part of a large OTKA (Hungarian Scientific Research Fund) study, 
which develops step by the step the methodology of the FOI model and discusses all of the development models found among OECD 
countries. 
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GROWTH AND 
DEVELOPMENT IN ECONOMICS 
Growth and development are mentioned almost as 
synonyms in this paper, although the literature usually 
addresses them separately. The simplest approach is to 
say that growth is the narrower, and development is the 
more complex class, as growth is usually defined as an 
increase in certain quantitative variables, while 
development describes a process of moving from a lower 
level of quality to a higher one (Szentes 2011). As the 
measurement of the phenomena economics usually deals 
with is problematic anyway, the most popular, formalised 
growthmodels (e.g. Domar 1947, Harrod 1948, Solow 
1956, Romer 1986, Lucas 1988) concentrate on the 
national income or on its per capita version. These 
models therefore map the problem of 
growth/development through the quantitative change of a 
single indicator, so they offer tools to analyse the 
problem of growth, the narrower category. 
The GDP however – being an aggregate indicator – 
veils more profound processes that are crucial for 
development, such as the structure of the economic 
system, changes in employment, income distribution or 
the institutional framework, etc. For this reason, from 
now on, we will use the more complex approach to 
development whenever we touch upon issues of growth 
and/or development paths, factors of growth and/or 
development, meaning that we interpret development as a 
combination of two things: growth in the indicators of 
national income, and the modernising of the 
socioeconomic structures. 
Theories of Development 
The different schools of economics have had different 
views on the rules of the economy, and they do not agree 
on the basic assumptions either; hence, a wide variety of 
theories have been developed over the centuries. While 
most schools implicitly assume that the models used are 
universal, List (1841) was convinced that the classical 
theories may only apply to the most developed 
economies; the followers of new institutionalism (see 
Williamson 2000, for example) point out that the 
institutional structure of different countries can be very 
different. A similar confrontation can be observed 
regarding the development paths. It is widely accepted 
that development is unilinear, meaning that all countries 
have to go through the same development stages (with 
timing being the only difference among them). Veblen 
(1919) on the other hand argued against the teleological 
approach of economics, and suggested an evolutionary 
one instead. 
It worth mentioning that mainstream theories do not 
consider the effects of national interests and bargaining 
power in their models; heterodox schools on the other 
hand cannot accept the independent development of 
countries (although there is no agreement among them 
considering the exact nature of the interdependencies). It 
Zoltán Bartha – Andrea S. Gubik 
 4 
may seem natural to choose the countries and national 
economies as the unit of analysis; Wallerstein (1974), 
however, when describing the economic history of 
medieval Europe, concludes that modernisation cannot be 
understood within the national economy framework. He 
chooses the worldsystem as the unit of analysis instead.  
Some scholars have developed models with few 
explanatory factors; others have gone for more variables. 
The well-known growth theories pick one or two 
variables; Porter’s diamond model (1990) combines four 
quite complex factors; the empirical study of Barro 
(1998) of 100 countries spanning over 30 years finds 
seven factors that are strongly connected to the growth 
rate of the real GDP. 
The factors of development identified in the 
economics literature can be categorised along many 
principles, but the location of factors is probably the most 
important division line. One camp of economists traces 
back differences in economic development to reasons that 
can be found inside the country. They point to factors 
whose presence (e.g. physical or human capital) or lack 
(e.g. government failures) enables high growth rates. 
Another group of economists finds the causes of 
underdevelopment in outside factors. Usually these 
theories take the differences in the development level as 
given in the world economy, and they assume that these 
differences lead to asymmetric dependencies. The 
asymmetric dependencies on the other hand make it very 
difficult for underdeveloped countries to catch up with 
the rich world.The inside-outside distinction among the 
factors of development plays a crucial role in the model 
developed during our research. 
The Inside Factors of Development 
Adam Smith (1776) saw the division of labour as the 
main source of wealth. The countries that are able to 
extend the division of labour among their firms and 
citizens can become wealthier, as they are able to produce 
a higher quantity with the same labour input. The main 
finding of the Harrod–Domar model (1947, 1948) is that 
investments are the key to economic growth. Investments 
on the other hand are mainly dependent on the savings 
rate. Around a decade later Solow (1956) pointed out that 
investments and savings cannot contribute to growth in 
the long run. In his view, long-term economic growth is 
driven by technical change. 
Keynes (1936) suggested crises are generated by 
limits in demand, and the latter may be strengthened by 
large income differences. The speculative demand for 
money of those who are well off can be especially high, 
which prevents a substantial part of the income from 
turning into effective market demand. Inequalities in 
income distribution thus can be a setback for balanced 
growth. 
Schumpeter (1934) stressed that cyclical fluctuations 
should be regarded as a natural part of the economy, as 
entrepreneurs may only draw profits if they break the 
status quo of equilibrium. The way to break the status 
quo is through innovation, which therefore becomes the 
primary driver of the cyclical development. McClelland 
(1957) also emphasised the importance of the 
entrepreneurial class. In his view entrepreneurs are the 
pioneers of development, and their biggest motivator is 
not profit, but the achievement of some special goals (N-
achievement). 
When the big colonial empires collapsed, several 
academics explained the situation of the underdeveloped 
former colonies with a value system and social structure 
that was different from the Western one. In 
underdeveloped countries the rural characteristics of the 
society are dominant, meaning that labour is inefficient, 
immobile, the social structure is rigid, and the general 
attitude rejects individualism and risk taking (Meier 
1964). When local values confront the Western values, 
the society is split into two groups, and a dual social 
structure is formed (Boeke 1953), which is completed 
with a dual economic structure as well (where the 
traditional and modern sectors are insulated from each 
other). 
The role of human capital in growth and development 
is highlighted in various forms in the literature. Szentes 
(2011) quotes from A. Marshall: from a national 
perspective the capital invested in workers’ children is 
just as productive as capital invested in horses or 
machinery. Newer theories unquestionably suggest that 
capital invested in children is far more productive than 
that invested in horses and machinery. Endogenous 
growth theories see increasing returns as a prime source 
of long- term growth, and they directly or indirectly 
explain increasing returns with human capital. Lucas 
(1988) treats human capital as a reproducible one, an 
element of capital that the society is able to broaden at a 
constant rate. The expansion of human capital, on the 
other hand, leads to a constant increase in the 
productivity of the physical capital. Romer (1986) also 
can be connected to human capital. In his model, 
investments made in research and development produce 
positive externalities that enable a constant increase in the 
productivity of physical capital. 
Veblen (1919) points out that human behaviour is 
deeply affected by institutionalised rules of society. His 
views were taken over by new institutional economists 
(e.g. North 1993, Williamson 1998). According to them 
institutions affect the incentive system of an economy, 
while the incentive system on the other hand influences 
the behaviour, size and competition of firms, the level of 
investments and technological development, and so, 
ultimately the level of development of an economy. 
Underdevelopment thus is explained by institutional 
frameworks consisting of bad incentives, according to the 
new institutional school. 
Partially connected to the institutional approach is the 
theory of government failures, which was mainly brought 
into the attention of development experts by Tullock 
(1993). It was back in the 1960es when Tullock 
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suggested (1967) that the super profit that monopolistic 
structures offer can be an incentive for firms to lobby for 
government regulations granting monopolistic positions 
and monopoly profits. According to calculations made by 
Krueger (1974), the rent seeking behaviour of firms in the 
field of import licences caused a 7.3% GDP loss in India, 
and a 15% GDP loss In Turkey in 1964. The more 
corrupt a country is, the weaker the state is, the heavier 
the costs of rent seeking are, and so rent seeking can be 
one of the major obstacles of economic development. 
Porter’s (1990) national competitiveness theory adds 
some highly complex factors to the literature of economic 
development. A somewhat similar idea is suggested by 
Freeman (1987), who developed the theory of national 
innovation systems. These systems are centred around 
cooperation among businesses, the education system and 
the research infrastructure. 
The Outside Factors of Development 
The theory of comparative advantage developed by 
Ricardo (1817) had become one of the cornerstones of the 
laissez-faire approach of international relations. 
According to Ricardo the highest welfare level can only 
be ensured if trade is conducted along the lines of 
comparative advantages, and there is a free flow of 
goods. This free trade principle was questioned by many. 
List (1841) argued against laissez-faire. He defended 
protectionism, and suggested protective tariffs for newly 
established industries (the infant industry argument). His 
suggestions echoed those of Alexander Hamilton (1791) 
made in the newly formed USA. 
After the Second World War the focus of 
development economics shifted towards the power 
relations of different countries. Prebisch (1964) and 
Myrdal (1957) point out that underdeveloped states are 
dependent on richer countries, and so the current system 
of international division of labour is not based on 
comparative advantages. The internal economic 
structures of most of the developing countries are directly 
influenced by the developed ones through the colonial 
system (Myrdal: forced bilateralism). Balogh (1963) 
argues that as a result of power inequalities among 
parties, the economic structure of the developing 
countries has to be adjusted time after time to the changes 
generated by technical progress made in the developed 
economies, and the adjustment process prevents them 
from achieving longterm growth. The dependency 
relations lead to one-track specialisation (Singer 1964). 
The majority of exports of the developing countries are 
primary products and commodities, which leads to a 
decrease in the terms of trade over the long run. Bhagwati 
in his 1958 paper titled “Immiserizing growth” showed 
that the decrease in terms of trade can result in a decrease 
in the national income even if there is dynamic growth in 
the production of the export sector. One lesson learned 
from the literature of interdependencies is that a 
diversified export structure can be an important 
development factor. 
Emmanuel (1972) has gone as far as claiming that 
trade between developing and developed countries is an 
unequal exchange, which is a manifestation of the 
imperialism of trade. Unequal exchange was triggered by 
wage differences, and is sustained by the immobility of 
labour. Wallerstein (1974) also accepted the concept of 
unequal exchange, though he argued that it is a result of 
the different bargaining power of nations. The core-
periphery relations and the geographical position 
basically predestine the fate of nations, according to 
Wallerstein. 
Table 1 
Inside and outside development factors 
Inside factors Outside factors 
Division of labour  (Smith) Free trade – international 
division of labour (Ricardo) 
Savings rate (Harrod-Domar) 
Abundance-scarcity of capital 
Protectionism 
Defence of infant industries 
(List) 
Equal-unequal income 
distribution (Keynes) 
Equal or unequal trade partners 
(Balogh) 
Pressure to fit to modern 
patterns (Balogh) 
Drive to innovate (Schumpeter) Unilateral dependency - 
diversification (Myrdal) 
Entrepreneurial behaviour 
(McClelland) 
One-sided specialisation 
(Singer) 
Rigid-flexible social structure 
(Meier) 
Imported or organically 
developed social structures 
(Boeke) 
Immiserising growth – terms of 
trade (Bhagwati) 
Forced bilateralism (Myrdal) 
Dual-homogeneous economic 
structures (Meier) 
International wage division- 
mobility of labour (Emmanuel) 
Investments into human capital 
(Marshall) 
Human capital, as a renewable 
resource (Lucas) 
Positive externalities of R&D 
(Romer) 
Geographical position – core 
and periphery (Wallerstein) 
Institutional incentives (North) 
Path-dependent development 
Investment strategies of 
multinational companies 
(Furtado) 
Government failure (Tullock) 
Rent-seeking (Krueger) 
Demonstration effect National diamond (Porter) 
Innovation systems (Freeman) 
Rule of law, democracy (Barro) 
As the role played by transnational companies in the 
international flow of goods and capital became more and 
more dominant, a great deal of attention was directed 
towards them. Furtado (1970) suggested that the most 
important development factor is not the 
interdependencies among countries any more, but the 
investment strategies of transnational companies. 
Transnational companies can bring capital to a country, 
creating jobs, but the newly formed subsidiaries may be 
isolated from the local economy (Singer 1964). The 
ability of a country to attract foreign capital, especially if 
the capital is invested in fields that can fit in well to the 
Zoltán Bartha – Andrea S. Gubik 
 6 
current economic structure of the economy, is another 
important development factor. 
The demonstration effects of modern consumer 
societies are worth mentioning, too. Generally the 
consumers of the developing countries try to follow the 
consumption patterns of the developed nations. This 
usually has a cut-down effect on local growth, as the 
goods fitting to the most current consumption trends are 
generally produced overseas, so following the trends 
increases imports, and can contribute to the trade balance 
deficit. 
The Role of Institutions in Development 
According to the followers of the institutional school, 
institutions affect human behaviour, in other words they 
influence the decisions of economic agents. Veblen was 
the first to point that out (1919), and also added that it is 
an oversimplification to assume that market decisions can 
be analysed independently from any other outside factors, 
like family, culture, community, politics, etc. His views 
were neglected by mainstream economics, but the topic 
was brought into the forefront again by two new research 
agendas. 
On the one hand it was proved by a series of 
psychological experiments that we are not capable of 
making such rational decisions as is assumed by 
economics. The notion of homo economicus was 
debunked by the theory of bounded rationality (Simon 
1957). Agents with bounded rationality behave 
opportunistically. On the other hand Coase’s pioneering 
article (Coase 1937) shed light on the fact that the 
transactions conducted among agents are not frictionless, 
and depending on the rate of frictions, very different 
market solutions may prove to be the most efficient ones. 
If we take a closer look at market transactions, it becomes 
clear that there are numerous social phenomena that are 
disregarded by mainstream economics, yet they influence 
the opportunistic behaviour of market agents and the rate 
of frictions during transactions. These social phenomena 
are collectively called institutions. 
Hodgson defines institutions (2006) as systems of 
established and prevalent social rules that structure social 
interactions. According to the definition above, language, 
money, etiquette, the measurement system, and firms can 
all be regarded as institutions. Institutions make it easier 
to calculate and forecast the behaviour of agents, thus 
they contribute to the decrease of uncertainty and 
frictions during transactions. North (1993) offers a 
similar definition of institutions: institutions are the rules 
of the game in a society or, more formally, are the 
humanly devised constraints that shape human 
interaction. 
Williamson (1998) suggested a hierarchy that proved 
very useful during our analysis. He separated social 
analysis into four levels (Figure 1). The different levels 
are ranked according to the time needed to change them, 
but they also show what influences what in the society. 
Higher levels directly influence the level just below them, 
meaning that no practices may be adopted on the lower 
levels that are not compatible with the superior levels. 
Social embeddedness is on top of the hierarchy (L1). 
Williamson puts norms, customs, ethical principles, 
traditions, conventions and religion into this category. 
Some development factors found in the literature at least 
partly belong to this level (e.g. the dual structure of the 
society, entrepreneurial behaviour). 
The institutional environment forms the second level 
(L2). While the informal rules were placed in Level 1, the 
rules of L2 are formal, codified ones (e.g. constitution, 
laws, property rights). Although the change of Level 2 
rules is also partly evolutionary in nature, calculated 
interference is also possible on this level (unlike on L1). 
Such interferences are called first-order economising, 
which is about finding the ideal combination of formal 
rules. Many of the development factors belong to the 
institutional environment: the rule of law, democratic 
rights, market regulation and protectionism. 
 
Figure 1. Economics of institutions (Williamson 1998, p. 26) 
First-order economising, however, does not ensure the 
optimal economic structure. As agents behave 
opportunistically, they do not keep the formal rules of the 
economy all the time. Jurisdiction has also got its 
frictions, meaning that those who follow the rules are not 
able to enforce their rights against the opportunists 
instantly and without any costs. This is where the third 
level (L3) kicks in, called governance by Williamson. 
The unit of analysis in governance is the transactions 
made among economic agents, and the contracts 
mediating those transactions. Such development factors 
as the coordination of education and research, Porter’s 
 
Level Frequency (years) Purpose 
102 - 103 
10 - 102 
1 - 10 
continuous 
Often noncalculative, 
spontaneous 
Get the institutional 
environment right 
1st-order economizing 
Get the governance structures 
right 
2nd-order economizing 
Get the marginal conditions 
right 
3rd-order economizing 
L1 
L2 
L3 
L4 
Embeddedness:  
informal institutions, 
customs, traditions, 
norms, religion 
Governance: play of the 
game – esp. contract 
(aligning governance 
structures with 
transactions) 
Resource allocation and 
employment 
(prices and quantities, 
incentive alignment) 
Institutional 
environment: formal 
rules of the game – esp. 
property (polity, 
judiciary, bureaucracy) 
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national diamond, government failures or rent seeking, 
can all be reckoned among L3 items. 
The final level (L4) is concerned with the allocation 
of resources, an area which is traditionally addressed by 
neoclassical economics. The factors of the better-known 
growth theories (quantities of labour and capital, savings, 
investments, etc.) all belong to this level. 
Williams thinks that new institutional economics 
addresses problems belonging mainly to Levels 2 and 3. 
North’s and Hodgson’s definitions cited above, however, 
suggest that all phenomena belonging to L1, L2 and L3 
can be regarded as institutions. This paper therefore treats 
all factors as institutional factors that can be categorised 
in one of the top three levels of Williamson’s hierarchy. 
METHODOLOGY 
Structure of the Model 
To identify the crucial development factors of 
Hungary, and in order to sketch potential development 
paths for the country, we developed the FOI model. The 
model is primarily based on the factors collected from the 
literature, but these factors are structured in a unique way 
which allows us to draw up characteristic development 
paths that can be clearly separated from each other. We 
used the following assumptions when the FOI model was 
set up: 
➣ National economies are the unit of our analysis; 
international interdependencies are mostly 
disregarded in the paper. 
➣ The key to development is not a single factor, 
but rather a combination of many factors. 
According to our assumption there are several 
important motors of development; sometimes 
these factors do influence each other, and it is 
very difficult to determine what causes what, 
still they can be equally important, and they all 
have to be used to draw up a potential 
development path for Hungary. 
➣ Among the many factors considered in the 
model, the so-called institutional factors play a 
primary role. Institutional factors are detected 
using the hierarchy put forward by Williamson 
(1998). In fact the model was developed with the 
aim of stressing the importance of institutional 
factors in development. 
➣ Development can take more than one shape and 
form. There are several feasible development 
paths, and Hungary is not constrained to only 
one of them, but may choose from a (limited) 
number of such paths. To determine these 
development paths, the FOI model was used to 
test the OECD countries. 
The FOI model offers a new typology of development 
factors, but it is also capable of structuring these factors 
along three clear directions of development. As shown 
previously, the inside-outside typology of development 
factors is a standard part of the literature.The FOI model, 
however, is based on a three-dimensional structure. These 
three dimensions are: 
➣ F, i.e. the future potential of a country; 
➣ O, i.e. the outside potential of a country; 
➣ I, i.e. the inside potential of a country. 
All three dimensions are complex, composed of a 
large scale of factors. Yet they can still be clearly 
distinguished from each other, which is useful because 
the clear distinction can help in the formulation of 
distinctive development strategies.  
The future potential includes factors that are regarded 
to be crucial for the sustainability and future 
competitiveness of the Hungarian economy. As 
sustainability has become one of the main paradigms of 
all social sciences, we felt that the inclusion of it as a 
separate development dimension was essential. In our 
case sustainability translates to ensuring that the typical 
signs and indicators of a developed country 
characterisenot only the current state of the economy but 
also the relatively distant future. 
The outside potential includes factors that are crucial 
to the current world market position of Hungary. This 
second dimension can be treated as an equivalent of the 
outside factors listed based on the literature. Some of the 
elements of the outside potential may not be influenced 
from the inside; others, like the conditions affecting the 
international flow of goods, services and factors of 
production, are a standard part of economic policy.  
The inside potential is made up of factors that are 
regarded to be crucial to the current well-being and 
development of Hungary. Most of the inside factors listed 
in Table 1 fall into this potential. Countries that offer 
favourable conditions to local entrepreneurs, and provide 
a high level of quality of life to their inhabitants, can have 
remarkable inside potential. 
It is not difficult to spot that certain trade-offs exist 
among the three potentials. Higher wage levels, for 
example, are absolutely favourable from the perspective 
of the inside potential, but they can be dangerous for the 
outside potential of the country. They can also be 
threatening to the future potential, if the result of a high 
wage level is overconsumption. If a country is well 
endowed with natural resources, this can boost its inside 
and outside potentials, but the abundance of resources 
usually leads to high proportions of waste, which again 
harms the future potential. The three potentials were 
drafted with these trade-offs in mind. 
Formulating a Measurement Method 
During a brainstorming session a list of 50 indicators 
was compiled with the help of experts. These 50 
indicators were chosen to measure the relevant 
development factors, and they were all included in a 
questionnaire. Experts were asked to rank all 50 
indicators on a 1-7 scale (1=not relevant at all; 7= of 
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highest significance). Each indicator received three 
separate scores: one for future potential, one for outside 
potential and one for inside potential. The respondents 
had to give a high score to an indicator if they believed it 
greatly contributed to the sustainability and future 
competitiveness (F potential), current world market 
position (O potential) or current well-being (I potential) 
of Hungary. The questionnaire was completed by 28 
experts. Most of them were active members of the 
Committee on Future Research of the Hungarian 
Academy of Sciences. Representing several academic 
fields (arts, engineering, medicine, natural and social 
sciences), they offered a wide perspective and a strong 
future-oriented attitude, values that are highly useful in 
this kind of research. 
 
Table 2 
The components of the future, outside and inside potentials 
Future potential Outside potential Inside potential 
Social responsibility (L1-3) Trade to GDP ratio (L3-4) Burden of government regulation (L2-3) 
Industrial disputes (L1) Country credit rating (L4) Quality of life (L4) 
Energy infrastructure (L3) Exchange rate stability (L3) Collected total tax revenues (L3) 
Total public expenditure on education per capita (L3) Financial institutions' transparency (L3) Pension funding (L2-3) 
Ageing of society (L1-2) English proficiency (L4) GDP (PPP) per capita (L4) 
Renewable energies (L3)  Real GDP Growth (L4) 
Healthy life expectancy (L3)  Ease of access to loans (L3) 
Ecological footprint (L1-2)  Rigidity of employment (L3) 
Total expenditure on R&D per capita (L3)  Labour force (L4) 
Total R&D personnel nationwide per capita (L3)  Skilled labour (L3) 
Educational assessment / Mathematics (L3)   
 
During the processing of the questionnaires every 
indicator was placed in the group (F, O or I potential) 
where it scored highest, meaning that an indicator could 
only be part of one of the potentials. In order to eliminate 
some of the less important factors (which received low 
scores in all three dimensions), we disregarded 
everything that had a score below average. The final 
transformation left us with 27 factors: 12 of them 
influence the future potential, 10 the inside and 5 the 
outside potential (Table 2). 
The final version of the model was fine-tuned 
usingthe statistical data of the OECD countries. 
THE FOI ANALYSIS 
OF THE OECD COUNTRIES 
To quantify the future, outside and inside potentials, 
the FOI-indices were calculated. The value of the 27 
components (listed in Table 2) were gathered for all 34 
OECD members for the year 2010, and then all values 
were transformed to a 1-7 scale using the min-max 
method. By averaging the standardised values, we were 
able to calculate the F-, O- and I-indices of all 34 
countries (Table 3). 
 
Table 3 
The F-, O- and I-indices of the OECD countries 
 F O I 
Australia 4.20 5.32 4.35 
Austria 4.70 5.41 4.05 
Belgium 3.90 5.56 3.47 
Canada 3.90 5.41 4.50 
Chile 3.80 5.03 4.13 
Czech Republic 3.10 4.97 3.57 
Denmark 4.80 5.77 4.30 
Estonia 3.00 4.94 3.08 
Finland 5.00 5.72 4.02 
France 4.40 4.46 3.04 
Germany  4.30 5.26 3.73 
Greece  2.90 3.66 2.50 
Hungary 2.90 4.56 2.55 
Iceland 5.90 2.33 4.42 
Ireland 3.90 4.17 3.91 
Israel 3.60 4.89 4.13 
Italy 3.50 3.82 2.66 
 
 F O I 
Japan 4.80 3.68 4.01 
South Korea 4.00 4.26 3.33 
Luxembourg 5.30 6.56 4.45 
Mexico 2.70 3.98 2.85 
Netherlands 4.40 5.54 3.83 
New Zealand 4.20 4.52 4.00 
Norway 5.20 5.70 4.13 
Poland 2.90 4.42 3.07 
Portugal 3.50 4.33 2.91 
Slovakia 3.00 4.82 3.25 
Slovenia 3.40 5.08 2.70 
Spain 3.40 4.23 2.99 
Sweden  5.10 5.22 4.13 
Switzerland 5.40 5.37 4.89 
Turkey 3.30 3.63 3.14 
United Kingdom 3.90 4.35 3.60 
USA 3.80 4.27 4.47 
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Factor Analysis 
In order to better understand, what background factors 
drive the value of the different F-, O- and I-indices, a 
factor analysis was conducted with SPSS 19. Almost 150 
variables were tested during the analysis. In the first step, 
we checked how closely related those variables are to the 
three index values in the OECD countries, and what the 
direction of the relationship is. As a second step, all 
variables were only considered in the factor analysis of 
the index they had the highest correlational relationship 
with. 
We were able to establish three main groups of 
indicators that showed a significant correlation with the 
index of the future potential of the OECD countries. They 
were labelled Human capital, Accountable corporations 
and Quality of the education system. The Human capital 
factor is a combination of indicators measuring the 
education and health sectors, and the productivity. The 
Accountable corporations factor combines such factors as 
the ethical and social responsibility of organisations and 
the credibility of managers, and so it represents the social, 
ethical and environmental considerations of businesses. 
The third factor, Quality of education system, shows the 
returns on efforts made in the education system. 
Two factors were found with the factor analysis of the 
O-index, namely National goodwill and Investment 
conditions. The main distinction between the two factors 
is the time frame within which their indicators may be 
influenced by the decision maker. The Investment 
conditions factor includes variables that can be influenced 
relatively easily, even over the short term; the National 
goodwill on the other hand may only be changed over the 
very long term. 
Variables having a significant correlation with the I-
index can be separated into three factors. These factors 
were labelled Business competitiveness, Government 
intervention and Availability of resources.The Business 
competitiveness factor measures the microeconomic 
position of all businesses (small and medium-sized 
enterprises and large corporations) along such dimensions 
as productivity, efficiency and R&D&I. The other two 
factors describe the macroeconomic environment of the 
businesses, where the Government interventions consists 
of the regulation part and the Availability of resources the 
allocation part. 
 
Table 4 
The factors of the F-, O- and I-index 
F-index O-index I-index 
F1 Human capital O1 National goodwill I1 Business competitiveness 
Labour productivity (PPP)  
Overall productivity (PPP)  
Total health expenditure per capita  
Total public expenditure on education per 
capita  
Healthy life expectancy  
Total expenditure on R&D per capita 
Parallel economy  
Investment risk  
Image abroad  
Country credit rating  
Brain drain  
Risk of political instability  
Innovative capacity  
Productivity of companies  
Small and medium-size enterprises  
Information technology  
Large corporations 
 
F2 Accountable corporations O2 Investment conditions I2 Government intervention 
Ethical practices  
Social responsibility  
Credibility of managers  
Foreign investors  
Exchange rate stability  
Capital markets  
Investment incentives  
State ownership of enterprises 
Subsidies  
Finance and banking regulation  
Protectionism  
Legal and regulatory framework  
Ease of doing business  
Bureaucracy  
F3 Quality of the education system  I3 Availability of resources 
Educational assessment / Mathematics  
Educational assessment / Sciences  
Science in schools  
Educational system 
 Labour force  
Total primary energy supply per capita  
Burden of government regulation  
Employment rate  
Gross domestic savings 
F-index: KMO=0.823, explained proportion 76.4%; O-index: KMO=0.803, explained proportion 73.7%; I-index: KMO=0.791, explained proportion 
73.408%
1
 
Forming Clusters 
The FOI-indices and the factors determined during the 
factor analysis were used to identify typical clusters 
within the OECD countries. These artificial clusters were 
created based on the values of the F-, O- , and I-index, 
 
with the so-called half-scale method. As the indices 
canhave a value between 1 and 7, 4 is the mid-value. So 
all three indices were split into two groups: the values 
from 1 to 4 went into the group labelled as “low” (1), 
while the values above 4 were labelled as “high” (2). 
1 The Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin (KMO) value helps in determining how suited our variables are to factor analysis. A KMO value above 0.8 means that the 
variables are highly suitable. Principal component analysis and Varimax rotation were used during the analysis.
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Theoretically all 8 clusters could represent feasible 
combinations, but most of the 34 OECD members fall 
into 4 groups (the distribution is shown in Table 5). Inour 
interpretation these four groups of countries represent the 
development models within the OECD. 
The current paper focuses on Group 3, which is called 
the dual model. As half-scaling was used as a method of 
clustering, it is obvious that the countries of the dual 
model perform above average in their outside potential. A 
closer inspection of the factors shows, however, that 
these countries are especially strong in ensuring 
favourable Investment conditions, and their National 
goodwill (the other factor of the O-index) is below 
average. They are all characterised by liberalised capital 
flow regulations, exchange rate stability, accessible 
capital markets and incentive policies for investments. As 
far as the F-index is concerned, they perform poorly in 
the Quality of the education system and Human capital, 
while they are barely below average in the Accountable 
corporations factor. In the case of the I-index, the value 
of the Government intervention factor is slightly above 
average, although that cannot compensate for their weak 
performance in the other factors of Business 
competitiveness and Availability of resources. 
Table 5 
The clusters of OECD countries according to the 
half-scale method 
Group & Code Country 
1 (111) Greece, Italy, Mexico, Portugal, Turkey 
3 (112) Chile, Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, 
Israel, Poland, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain 
5 (211) United Kingdom 
6 (212) Iceland 
7 (221) Belgium, France, Netherlands, Ireland, 
South Korea, New Zealand 
8 (222) Australia, Austria, Canada, Denmark, 
Finland, Germany, Japan, Luxembourg, 
Norway, Sweden, Switzerland, United 
States 
The F-, O- and I-index values are indicated in brackets, where 
1=countries with index values between 1 and 4; 2=above 4. 
No countries fell into Groups 2 or 4. 
It is not difficult to spot a strong focus on outside 
resources in the factor structure of the third cluster. These 
countries create a favourable environment for the world 
market-oriented companies, and they adopt policies that 
lead to a more liberalised government regulation. For this 
reason their economies may be characterised with the 
classical dual structure: a competitive, outside-oriented 
sector that relies substantially on outside resources, and a 
traditional sector applying local capital that is at least 
partially isolated from the other sector. The main 
characteristic of the dual model therefore is a strong focus 
on attracting outside resources, with the help of which the 
economy can be modernised and a higher growth rate 
might be achieved. 
THE DUAL MODEL AS A 
DEVELOPMENT STRATEGY 
The cluster and factor analysis based on the FOI-
indices lead us to three promising development models 
(Clusters 3, 7 and 8). Here we discuss in detail the dual 
model, which implies a strategy that is focused on the 
attraction of outside resources. In other words we argue 
that if the goal is to move towards the dual model, the 
economic policy should concentrate on a strategy centred 
on the attraction of outside resources. If we draw a 
parallel between the development model (deducted from 
the clusters of countries) and the economic policy 
strategy, we can also tell which factors are most 
important for the outside-resources-oriented strategy. We 
have seen that the third cluster exceeds in one of the 
outside factors, called Investment conditions, and in one 
of the inside ones, called Government intervention. These 
two will be the areas that the economic policy needs to 
address when the strengthening of the dual model is the 
goal. 
As a next step we checked which of the OECD 
members scored well in these two factors, and which of 
them has a comparable size to Hungary. In Investment 
conditions Ireland scores the highest, Austria is seventh, 
Finland and Denmark are eleventh and twelfth 
respectively; in Government intervention Finland is 
second, Denmark is fifth, Ireland is ninth and Austria is 
eleventh. Country studies were prepared of these four 
countries to detect those best practices that allowed them 
to excel in the areas measured by the two factors above. 
The country studies are fairly extensive and therefore 
cannot be included in the paper, but the lessons learned 
from them are featured in the final sections (the country 
studies are accessible in the Appendix of Bartha, Gubik 
and Tóthné Szita 2013). The final goal is to use the FOI 
analysis and the country studies to offer relevant policy 
recommendations for Hungary. 
The Strategy Based on the 
Attraction of Outside Resources 
In 2010 Hungary was part of the third cluster of the 
OECD countries, so it can be best characterised with the 
dual model. For this reason Hungary’s adjustment 
strategy has been closest to the one based on the 
attraction of outside resources. This argument is further 
backed by the fact the best two scores of Hungary come 
in those two factors that are identified as the strongest of 
the dual model: the country is ninth in Investment 
conditions and eighteenth in Government intervention 
(this may not seem to be a good ranking, but they both 
can be considered as strengths compared to Hungary’s 
twenty-fourth overall place). The outside-oriented 
strategy is not uncommon in the region either: all of the 
ex-communist OECD members (the Czech Republic, 
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Estonia, Poland, Slovakia and Slovenia) fall into the third 
group. But despite the fact that Hungary’s two best scores 
come in Government intervention and Investment 
conditions, there is still plenty of room for improvement. 
Table 6 
Development areas for the strategy focused on the 
attraction of outside resources 
Level Component 
L2 Advanced political culture 
Low level of corruption 
Stable and foreseeable socio-economic environment 
Stable public finances 
Exchange rate stability – Eurozone membership 
L2-L3 
transition 
Social partnership in labour market affairs 
Collective agreement of employers and employees on 
national, sectorial and company level 
L3 Transparent government, e-government solutions 
Regulatory impact assessment – measuring the effects 
of government interventions 
L3-L4 
transition 
Persistently low corporate tax rate, with additional tax 
exemptions 
State of the art infrastructure 
Stable investment environment, coordinated tax and 
subsidy system 
Support for company-university-researcher 
cooperation  
L4 Clearly defined development goals: research and 
development, information and communication 
technologies 
Substantial state subsidies on corporate innovation  
Substantial central help for start-ups and export 
expansion, involving subsidies, information and 
counselling services, and business support agencies 
Low level of corporate tax rates 
Flexible labour market 
Our suggestions were put forward using Williamson’s 
(1998) hierarchy (Table 6). As the lowest level (L4) 
summarises the current issues of resource allocation, the 
actions listed here theoretically can have an instant effect 
on the economy. Economic policy measures may belong 
to this level as well, if we assume that changes in 
regulations, taxes or subsidies have an instant effect on 
the market behaviour of firms and individuals. The 
longer-term effect of central intervention is that persistent 
measures change the structure of the market and the 
economy, and the relationships among firms. These 
belong to the governance part of the economy (L3). The 
strategy focusing on the attraction of outside resources 
requires a predictable government, and that on the other 
hand requires the stability of the political system. That is 
why Level 2 is also present in Table 6, but it has to be 
said that changes on this level may take decades, 
according to Williamson. 
We shall start the presentation of our suggestions with 
those belonging to the highest level (L2). Because of the 
hierarchical system, the factors higher above are the 
prerequisites of anything below them. We have found that 
one of the pillars of best practice is the reliability of the 
economic policy. The corporate tax decrease policy in 
Ireland was started more than two decades ago, and it was 
consistently carried out; the many decades of minority 
governments has led to a special culture of political 
consensus seeking in Denmark that makes it possible to 
carefully plan and fine-tune long- term social policies; the 
state is committed to long-term development goals in 
Austria and Finland. Political stability is coupled with the 
transparency of the public sector and a very low level of 
corruption in all cases. The latter two further enforce the 
reliability of economic policy, as they decrease the 
chance of interest groups capturing the state, and 
destabilising the policy making. 
Disciplined public finances are also an important part 
of the best practices. After the 2008 financial crisis it is 
clear that balanced budgets are important, but they seem 
to be an absolute must for a reliable investment 
environment. A stable budget position guarantees that the 
government does not have to take unexpected measures 
that affect company costs (e.g. tax raises or new taxes, 
withdrawing tax remedies, subsidies). 
The reliability of monetary policy, more particularly 
the reliability of exchange rate policy, is equally as 
important as that of fiscal policy. It is well known that 
exchange rate stability is a central element of the 
economic policy measures of open economies. The euro 
partially ensures that stability, although the exchange rate 
against other major currencies can still be very volatile. 
Because at least two-thirds of the trade of the European 
countries is conducted within Europe, the euro is able to 
provide a relative stability on the continent, and lets the 
member countries get rid of the best part of their 
exchange rate risks. 
The institutional framework that ensures the stability 
of the labour market was placed between Levels 2 and 3. 
Labour market issues are basically part of the allocation 
problem, so they should belong to Level 4. But it is also 
known that the pure market model is not an efficient one 
on the labour market, and usually there are dozens of 
institutional factors regulating it. This why the 
institutional framework of the labour market is higher up 
in Williamson’s hierarchy. In Austria and Denmark the 
collective bargaining system is completely integrated into 
the institutions of the central government, and therefore it 
is linked to Level 2, but it also has an effect on the 
governance of companies (L3), which is why it was put 
as a transition between the two levels. 
The dependency on the higher level structures is 
especially true of labour market institutions. More 
precisely, the Danish-Austrian type of social partnership 
and collective bargaining system can only be successful if 
the willingness to seek compromises and solidarity are an 
integral part of a country’s culture (factors belonging to 
L1 and L2). Hungary had experimented with the system 
in the 1990es, but gave up on it after several failures, so 
the suggestions on L2-L3 are only for the sake of 
comparison. Immediate action cannot be taken based on 
them. What is worth remembering is that long-term 
labour market stability is key to the outside-resources-
oriented strategy, and this can only be achieved if a well-
functioning institutional framework is in place. Some 
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areas require some sort of central regulation and 
planning: the smoothing of cyclical fluctuations (e.g. 
compensating for lost income in case of becoming 
unemployed); balancing structural weaknesses (e.g. the 
feedback of labour market needs to the education 
system). In other cases institutional guarantees may be 
needed to prevent the state from distorting the market 
(e.g. separating real wage changes from market powers).  
The second-order economising called governance by 
Williamson (L3) represents the efficiency of the 
government regulations in case of an economic policy 
analysis. This is important for the attraction of outside 
resources, because the administrative burdens of the 
bureaucracy increase the transaction costs of everyone, 
including the owners of foreign resources. The extent of 
transaction costs caused by the state therefore is a prime 
indicator of both capital investors and immigrants. 
Denmark and Finland are front runners in e-government 
solutions. These solutions provide huge advantages: e.g. 
they make bureaucracy more transparent, increase the 
speed at which services can be provided by the state, 
make it easier to declare and pay taxes, and help in 
creating huge databases that make public policy decisions 
more reliable. 
Ireland is a great example for regulatory impact 
analysis. Stating from 2000 they gradually adopted the 
principle that the market distortion effects of government 
regulations are assessed. Basically a systematic attempt 
was made to quantify the transaction costs and changes in 
market behaviour caused by the intervention of the state. 
Thanks to the regulatory impact analysis the instruments 
that have the strongest market distortion effect may be 
filtered out, and the costs of both the state and the 
business sector can be decreased. The introduction of this 
approach has the added bonus of showing a more rational 
image of the bureaucracy, and making it look more 
attractive for investors. 
All of our other suggestions consist of economic 
policy measures that have a direct effect on the allocation 
of resources, and an instant impact on the economy, and 
so they belong to Level 4 (or to the transition between L3 
and L4). The hierarchical structure still applies,of course; 
the lower-level suggestions can only work efficiently if 
they are compatible with the higher-level characteristics 
of the country. 
Ireland, Denmark and Austria have each set up a tax 
system where the relatively high overall tax burden is 
achieved with a low corporate tax rate (although the 
orders of magnitude are different: Ireland has one the 
lowest corporate tax rates in the world, its effective value 
is below 10%; the Danish is somewhat higher than the 
Irish, while the Austrian corporate tax rate can only be 
considered low if we compare it to the average of the 
developed welfare states). As the tax rate is a pivotal 
point in the investment decisions of the transnational  
companies, a consistently low corporate tax can be a 
great attraction. 
In all countries the state support for clusters is a main 
priority. Clusters usually involve the cooperation of 
companies, research institutes, universities, development 
agencies and risk capital firms, but they are also 
supported by the state. The practice of Denmark, Austria, 
Ireland or Finland shows that state support alone is not 
enough; the clusters may only be successful if they carry 
special knowledge that is competitive in the world 
market. Those industries are worth supporting that have 
traditionally performed well and whose main companies 
are well known on the world market (good examples for 
the Danish are food, pharmaceutics and wind energy, for 
the Finnish wood or information technology, for the Irish 
process innovation, and for the Austrians car 
manufacturing clusters). 
The flexible labour market is another attraction for 
transnational companies. If the termination of 
employment does not require a lot of administrative tasks, 
and can be carried out with relatively low costs, 
companies are able to adjust to the fluctuations in the 
world market demand. Denmark also has a social safety 
net, and applies several active labour market instruments 
that ensure that the unemployed can find a new job 
relatively quickly.  
The suggestions in Table 6 will not only strengthen 
the model based on the attraction of outside resources, 
but the FOI analysis showed that they primarily affect the 
factors that are the pillars of such an economic policy 
orientation. The economic policy should concentrate on 
these instruments, if the main priority is the attraction of 
outside resources. 
CONCLUSION 
The dual model detected with the FOI model can be 
characterised as a development strategy based on the 
attraction of outside resources. Countries choosing this as 
a priority try to create an internal business and regulation 
environment that will make them attractive to outside 
investors. The more attractive environment may 
encourage the inflow of outside resources, which are 
needed because the local capital and knowledge 
generation is not sufficient. Many historical examples 
confirm that such a development strategy can prove 
successful, but the global environment has its risks as 
well. On the one hand overreliance on outside resources 
can result in a dependent position, because the sudden 
withdrawal of resources may lead to the collapse of the 
economy. The dependent position on the other hand can 
push the country toward an institutional environment 
favouring outside agents to the local ones – a process that 
further strengthens the exposure of the country.  
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What steps are recommended to adopt a development 
strategy based on the attraction of outside resources? 
➣ Long-term commitment to relevant policy 
incentives, such as: 
 decreasing and keeping corporate tax rates low; 
 exchange rate stability; 
 tax remedies and subsidies targeted towards 
large corporations; 
 infrastructure development; 
 or a combination of the above. 
➣ Making the central bureaucracy and government 
decision-making process more transparent, 
introducing a wide variety of e-government 
solutions. 
➣ Labour market mix: easing of the recruitment 
and layoff rules, increasing the flexibility on the 
one hand, maintaining stability on the other hand 
(minimal loss of working hours, modest wage 
increase). 
The hierarchy presented in Figure 1 shows that 
careful consideration of instruments is needed before any 
steps are taken, because positive outcomes can only be 
expected from economic policy measures that are in 
harmony with the institutional framework of the country. 
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